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Abstract
This paper analyzes the link between export destination, skill utilization and skill premium. We
identify the mechanism behind these links: the difference in quality valuation of the product across
exporting destinations and the distribution of level of skill among the skilled workers in the labor
market. Theory suggest that the consumers in the high income countries value the quality of the
same product more than their counterparts in middle or low income countries. To produce a higher
quality product, a firm needs not only more skilled workers but also higher quality skilled workers.
To attract and keep the higher quality worker, firm needs to incentivize her by providing higher
wage as compared to the firms that would be exporting to middle or low income countries. We test
this theory using cross-section of more than 160,000 single product Chinese Manufacturing firms
survey data, of which nearly 22,000 are exporting to more than 200 countries across the world.
We find that firms exporting to high income countries pay higher average wages, hire more skilled
workers, defined by education level, and pay higher skill premium as compared to firms exporting
to middle or low income countries or selling domestically. Similar to the recent literature, we also
didn’t find the impact of exporting per se on the proportion of skilled workers or the skill premium
in the firm.
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INTRODUCTION
Much of the traditional literature in International Trade has been focused on the exporting be-
havior of the firm. It has widely been established that the firms involved in exporting activity are
bigger in size, more productive and pay higher wages. Though there has not been much consensus
on whether more productive firms self-select into exporting activity (Bernard and Jensen 1995;
Clerides, Lach, and Tybout 1998) or whether the exporting activity helps to improve the produc-
tivity of the firms by using more efficient technologies for production or hire more skilled workers
(Bustos 2011; Matsuyama 2007). In some of the more recent literature, Bastos and Silva (2010),
Verhoogen (2008), Manova and Zhang (2012) suggests that the characteristics of the country of
destination such as income, distance, transportation costs etc. might describe the firm behavior and
its choice of production techniques. Brambila et al. (2012), Brambila and Porto (2016) have estab-
lished a causal link between the exporting destination and the proportion of skilled workers in the
firm whereas Frazer (2013) has established a similar link between the importing destination and the
skill utilization at the firm level. In this paper, we elaborate upon the theoretical literature on the
export destinations and utilization of skills and also establish a link between the export destination
and skill premium being awarded at the firm level using Chinese manufacturing firms data. Using
cross-sectional data for 60 countries, Hallak (2006) have shown that the consumers in the richer
countries demand higher quality products. Building on this idea introduced by Hallak (2006), Ver-
hoogen (2008) has developed a model linking trade and wage inequality in developing countries.
He has shown that exporting allows the firms to upgrade their product’s quality. In order to produce
higher quality products, firms attract better quality labor by paying them higher wages. Because
of this quality upgrading, it leads to higher wage inequality in exporting firms and non-exporting
firms within the industry. Matsuyama (2007) have found some other channel for impact of export
destination on the proportion of skilled workers in the firm. Matsuyma (2007) proposed a ”skill
biased globalization” model where exporting behavior requires tasks that are more skill intensive
in nature. These tasks are related to marketing the products in the international markets which
require workers who are more familiar with the international business practices, can communicate
with the foreign customers in their language and are careful about the intricacies of the foreign
culture. All these activities require proportionally more skilled workers than the firm that is sell-
ing domestically. Building on Verhoogen (2008) and Matsuyama (2007), Brambilla et al. (2012)
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have explores the link between the export destination of the firms and the proportion of skilled
workers hired by the firm. Their intuition is that consumers in higher income countries demand
higher quality products as they value high quality products more than the consumers in low income
countries i.e. their marginal valuation on income is relatively low. To produce higher quality prod-
ucts, firm need to hire proportionally more skilled workers. Using the manufacturing firms data
for Argentina, they have found that the exporting to higher income countries matter, but exporting
per se does not. Firms that tend to export more to high income countries use more skills and as a
result pay higher average wages compared to the firms that export to middle-income or low-income
countries. They have used average wage per worker and proportion of non-production workers as
a measure of skill intensity for the firms. In another paper by Brambilla & Porto (2016), they have
established a link between the income level of the export destination and the level of average wages
in the exporting country across the world. They have found a robust evidence, worldwide, that the
industries exporting their product to high income destination pay higher wages to their workers.
Using instrumental variable approach, they have shown a causal link for this phenomenon. They
have shown that the consumers in high income destination demand higher quality products and
provision of higher quality is costly and requires more intensive use of higher waged skilled labor.
Hence, the production of higher quality products at the industry level creates wage premium. They
have used the data for 82 countries from 1990-2000. They have dis-aggregated the data into 28
manufacturing sectors.
Similar to Brambila et al. (2012), Frazer(2013) have explored the link between imports, import
destination and the skill utilization for firms in Rwanda. He found that the importers in general
and the ones importing materials from richer countries in particular pay higher wages (and conse-
quentially, utilizes more skills). Though, nearly all of the above mentioned papers relating to skill
utilization use a crude definition of skilled workers. In Brambila et al. (2012) and Frazer (2013),
they interpreted higher average wage or the share of non-production workers to be the proxy for
higher utilization of skills in the firm.
Building on the work of Brambila et al. (2012), we are exploring whether the provision of
higher quality goods just require more intensive use of skilled workers or it also requires higher
quality skilled workers. Our intuition is that to produce higher quality products, the firm not only
need proportionally more skilled workers but they also require higher quality skilled workers. To
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test our hypothesis, we are using a cross-section of annual Chinese manufacturing firms data for
2004. It has detailed information about the firm including sales, exports, number of workers, wage
bill, capital ownership etc. and match it with the monthly customs data where information re-
garding every export or import activity by these firms is recorded by the custom authorities. In
addition, we also have the data related to distribution of workers by education level for these man-
ufacturing firms. After carefully matching these data-sets, we have found a statistically significant
relationship between export destination, skill utilization and skill premium at the firm level. The
availability of the data regarding distribution of education among the workers helps us to cleanly
define the measure for skills in the firm and analyze its relation to exporting destination.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section will discuss the basic economic
intuition for this paper and develops a model to describe a link between export destination and the
skill premium in the firm setting. In section 2, we would discuss the data and section 3 would
outline the empirical strategy employed to test the results of the model.
Model
In this section, we will develop partial equilibrium model analyzing the link between export des-
tination and the level of skill premium. On demand side, we assume that the products are differ-
entiated horizontally as well as vertically. The preferences are non-homothetic in order to capture
the idea that consumers in high income countries value high quality goods more than consumers
in low income countries. For simplicity, we would use a representative consumer for each country.
We are adopting the multi-nomial logit model as introduced by Verhoogen (2008). The customers
in the high income country has lower marginal utility of income and are willing to pay higher
price for the same quality good as compared to their counterparts in low income countries. The
consumer i in country c has the following utility by consuming product j of quality θ, a price p
and a random deviation following type-I extreme value distribution, cij as
Ucij = θ
c
j − αcpcij + cij
Using these assumptions, we will get the following demand function for the product j
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xcj(p
c
j, θ
c
j) =
Mc
W c
e(θ
c
j−αcpcj)
where M c is the number of consumers in country c and W c is an index that summarizes the
characteristics of all products available in country c ( i.e. W c = ΣzZce(θ
c
z−αcpcz)) given Zc defines
the set of available products.
Implicitly, we notice that the e
(θcj−αcpcj)
W c
is the probability of choosing the product j of quality
θ by a representative consumer in country c and we multiply it with the number of consumers in
country c to find out the expected demand for firm j product. αc measures the marginal utility
of income, or as per Verhoogen (2008), 1
αc
measures the quality valuation in country c. αc will
determine the relationship between θ and p in the consumer’s utility function. Higher the level
of per capita income in country c, lower will be the marginal valuation of income and hence,
consumers will be willing to pay more for the same quality product as compared to the consumers
in lower income countries.
On the supply side, there are J monopolistically competitive firms in the source country. Each
firm produces a differentiated product and can export it to multiple destinations or sell domestically.
The firm can also choose a different quality of it’s product for different exporting destinations,
based on the quality valuation in destination countries. We are assuming that the output can be
produced by using labor only. The firm j, in source country, can produce the variety of the quality
for it’s product as follows:
θj = (
bj
aj+bj
)( A
1+e−s )
Here aj and bj are the unskilled workers and skilled workers in the firms respectively. In
the above production of quality θ, we notice to produce higher quality, firm not only needs more
skilled workers, but also of higher quality i.e. the workers are heterogeneous in their level of skill
as introduced by Yeaple(2005). We assume that all unskilled workers in the economy are identical
and receives a wage of $1 whereas s is the level of skill of the skilled workers over (−∞,∞).
For current purposes, we can assume the level of skill is uniformly distributed among the skilled
workers. The higher is the value of s, higher is the quality of the skilled worker. For s (−∞,∞), θ
takes the value between 0 and A. A is the upper level of the quality of the product.
Now, since the skilled workers vary by quality, we also define the compensation of the skilled
workers as function of s. The skilled worker’s wage of quality s is given by (1 + K
1+e−s ) i.e.
K
1+e−s
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is the premium that the skilled worker of quality s gets over and above the unskilled worker.
Given the above assumptions, a monopolistically competitive firm, producing product j of
quality θ and selling it to consumers in country c at a price p, would maximize the profit as:
Maxpcj ,s,bj pi
c
j = [p
c
j − aj − bj(1 + K1+e−s )]xcj(pcj, θcj)− F c
or
Maxpcj ,s,bj pi
c
j = [p
c
j − aj − bj(1 + K1+e−s )]e(θ
c
j−αcpcj)Mc
W c
− F c
For the firm j in the source country, M c and W c will be exogenous. F c is the fixed cost
of exporting to country c. It can be thought of as transportation costs, or other regulatory costs
involved in exporting to country c.
The first order conditions for the above maximization problem would be:
pcj : e
(θcj−αcpcj)(1− αcpcj + αcaj + αcbj(1 +
K
1 + e−s
)) = 0 (1)
bj :
e(θ
c
j−αcpcj)
1 + e−s
[
Aajp
c
j
(aj + bj)2
− Aa
2
j
(aj + bj)2
− (1 +K + e−s)− Aajbj(1 +K + e
−s)
(aj + bj)2)(1 + e−s)
] = 0 (2)
s :
e(θ
c
j−αcpcj)e−s
(1 + e−s)2
[
pcjAbj
(aj + bj)
− Aajbj
(aj + bj)
− bjK −
Ab2j(1 +K + e
−s)
(aj + bj)(1 + e−s)
] = 0 (3)
Now, from FOC of the price, we would have
pcj = aj + bj(
1 +K + e−s
1 + e−s
) +
1
αc
(4)
First we put this equation of price into the FOC for s, we would get
[(aj + bj(
1 +K + e−s
1 + e−s
) +
1
αc
)
Abj
(aj + bj)
− Aajbj
(aj + bj)
− bjK −
Ab2j(1 +K + e
−s)
(aj + bj)(1 + e−s)
] = 0
(5)
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After simplifying, we would get
b∗j =
A
αcK
− aj
Similarly, now we put the value of pcj and above found b into the FOC for b, we would have
[(aj+bj(
1 +K + e−s
1 + e−s
)+
1
αc
)
Aaj
(aj + bj)2
− Aa
2
j
(aj + bj)2
−(1+K+e−s)−Aajbj(1 +K + e
−s)
(aj + bj)2)(1 + e−s)
] = 0
(6)
After simplifying, we would get
1 +K + e−s = ajα
cK2
A
From the above, it is clear that αc is inversely related with the level of skill s of the skilled the
worker. Now replacing 1 + e−s and bj into the first order condition for the price, we would get
pcj = aj + (
A
αcK
− aj)(1 + K
(
ajα
cK2
A
−K)
) + 1
αc
Data
For this paper we are using balance sheet data for Chinese Manufacturing firms from the Annual
Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics(NBS) for
2004. ASIF cover all firms with sales above 5 million RMB during the survey year. There are
multi-product as well as single product firms in this data. The relevant information from this data-
set for this paper is the firm name, total sales, total capital, total fixed assets, total employment, total
wage bill and total exports. Using the Capital ownership information, we have also split the firms
into state owned and privately owned. In addition to ASIF, for trade related data, we are using the
comprehensive data-set provided by the General Administration of the Chinese Customs, known
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as Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS) for 2004. Customs data report the firm name, firm
code, value of firm-level exports and imports, export or import destination at the monthly level.
We first aggregate the Customs data to the annual level and then match it with ASIF.
In addition, for ASIF, we have the data about the number of employees with level of education.
For example, in firmX , we know how many workers are with middle school, high school, technical
diploma, bachelors and postgraduate degree. Contrary to Brambilla et al., we use education level
to split the workers into skilled and unskilled workers. We have defined the workers to have less
than high school education to be unskilled workers and the ones having education more than or
equal to high school be considered as skilled. We have also tried defining high school and less than
high school as unskilled and more than high school as skilled workers.
We matched these 3 data-sets using firm id and firm name. For the time being, we are just
looking at the single product firms as in case of multi-product firms, we cannot identify how much
of the labor is assigned to what product in the firm. After dropping multi-product firms from the
data, we are still left with nearly 22,000 exporting firms and nearly 140,000 non-exporting firms.
These firms are distributed over 524 industries at 4 digit level and across 399 cities in China.
Among these, 471 industries and 311 cities have atleast one exporting firm.
We split the countries into high income, middle income and low income countries using 2004
income per capita range as listed by World Bank. Countries having per capita income to be higher
than $9000 in 2004 are considered to be the high income countries.
Empirical Results
We start by stating the summary statistics for the Chinese manufacturing sector in 2004. We notice
that, on average, exporting firms are bigger by sales as well as employment, pay higher average
wages and have about the same assets per worker as the non-exporting firms. As the data is about
the manufacturing firms in China, we notice that more than half of the workers are unskilled as
defined by the level of education. For the exporting firms, nearly two-third of the exports are
directed towards the high income countries.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
All Firms
Total No. of Firms 162,862
No. of Exporting Firms 21,977
Average Proportion of Skilled workers 0.435
Average Proportion of workers with high school degree 0.32
Average Proportion of workers with diploma 0.08
Average Proportion of workers with Bachelors degree 0.029
Average Proportion of workers with Masters degree 0.002
Average Assets per worker 281,000 RMB
Average wage per worker 9,456 RMB
Average employees per firm 250
State Owned firms 0.41
Average Sales 46.66 Millon RMB
Exporting Firms only
Average exports/sales 0.64
Average proportion of Exports to HI 0.68
Average Assets per worker 279, 609 RMB
Average wage per worker 10,599 RMB
Average employees per firm 555
Average Sales 104.85 Million RMB
Average number of destinations per firm 21
Here is the list of variables that we would use for our empirical analysis.
Avg wage: Log of Average wage per worker
EXP : Export to Sales ratio for the firm. It captures the Export intensity of the firm
HI: Proportion of total exports that goes to high income countries.
SKILL: Proportion of skilled workers in the firm. We define skilled workers as education of high
school and above.
HS: Proportion of workers with the high school degree.
Diploma: Proportion of workers with technical diploma.
BS: Proportion of workers with Bachelors’ degree.
MS: Proportion of workers with Masters degree.
AGE: Age of the firm
Cap: Log of Total fixed Assets per worker
HI ∗ Y : Interaction term for HI and Y where Y can be SKILL,HS,Diploma,BS or MS.
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STATE: Dummy variable for state owned or not.
LI: Labor Intensity
PE: Pure Exporter Dummy
We start by running following regression similar to Brambilla’s paper. Initially, we define the
skilled workers to be ones with high school or more than high school level of education.
SKILL = β0 + β1HI + β2EXP + β3.X + 
Table 2
where X includes the interaction dummies for dummies for city and 4 digit industry code. For
all the regressions in this paper, we will be controlling the fixed effects at the interaction of 4 digit
industry and city level. That creates more than 30,000 cells for industry-city effect. In addition,
we are are clustering the errors at 4 digit industry-city level.
We notice that the export destination positively affects the proportion of skilled workers and is
significant. However, contrary to the literature, the coefficient for export intensity is negative and
significant.
Now, we would add some extra controls including age of firm, age squared, assets per employee
and a dummy for State owned firm. We would run the same regression as above but different
definition of X .
Table 3
where X further includes AGE, AGE squared, Cap, STATE, in addition to the above. We find
the similar results as above i.e. positive and significant effect of high income exporting destination
and negative and significant effect of exporting activity on proportion of skilled workers.
In order to address this negative impact of exporting behavior on the proportion of skilled
workers, we need to be careful in interpreting these results for China. Lu (2010) have shown
that, specifically for China, once we split the exporters into labor intensive and capital intensive
category, the exporters in labor intensive sector are less productive than the firms which are only
selling into the domestic market. In order to capture this feature, we introduced a measure of labor
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intensity in our analysis. We defined the labor intensity as ratio of wage to the value addition in
the firm i.e. if the higher proportion of the value addition goes back to the labor, such a firm would
be more labor intensive.
Similarly, Dai et al(2011), have shown that the firms which are involved in the processing trade
in China are also comparatively less productive. Processing trade firms are those ones that import
nearly all of the inputs from abroad, assemble it in Chinese Export Processing zones and ship all
of their output to the rest of the world. In order to capture these types of firms, we will use two
variables to define a dummy for processing trade firms and non-processing trade firms. First, we
will use pure exporting firm dummy i.e. the firms who ship all of their output abroad and don’t
sell anything in China. The intuition is that the processing trade firms will be exporting all of their
output the foreign firms for which they are processing the exports. Once we account for these
two effects, we notice that the coefficient of the export intensity hover around zero and it doesn’t
remain significant. Brambila et al., also didn’t find significant effect of exporting behavior on the
proportion of skilled workers in the firm. As found by Lu (2010) and Dai et al. (2011), we also
find significantly negative coefficient for labor intensity and pure exporter dummy i.e. more labor
intensive firms as well a firms involved in processing trade hire less proportion of skilled workers.
Table 4
Now, let’s analyze the impact of export destination on the skill premium in the firm. We will
first run the regression using the definition of skilled workers as used above. Later, we would
split the skilled workers into five categories defined by their education level. Then, we explore the
impact of export destination on extra premium for each category of education for skilled workers.
Now to test our main hypothesis of the paper, we will run the following regression to estimate
the impact of export destination on the skill premium in the firm.
Avg wage = β0 + β1SKILL+ β2HI + β3HI ∗ SKILL+ β4EXP + β5.X + 
Following are the results for this regression. Here X has interaction dummies for city and the
industry code as mentioned above. β3 will capture the additional premium being awarded to the
skilled workers as a result of exporting to high income destinations. As above, we find a significant
and negative impact of export intensity on the average wage as well.
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Table 5
Now, we add more controls (i.e. Age, Age squared, Cap, STATE) to X as above and get the
following results.
Table 6
In addition, we would also add LI and PE to control for the labor intensive firm and processing
trade firm.
Table 7
We notice a positive and significant coefficient for HI ∗ SKILL which shows that the firms
that export to high income destinations do pay an extra premium to their skilled workers. As
above, once we control for labor intensive industry and whether the exporting firm is involved
in processing trade or general trade, we don’t find any significant impact of export intensity on
average wages in the firm.
Now, let’s dis-aggregate the skilled workers into their education groups and analyze the impact
of export destination on skill premium for each category.
Table 8
Table 9
Table 10
We notice the same results for the 5 sub-categories of skill as well. We notice that every
educational category has an extra premium for exporting to high income destinations. It is positive
and significant. In addition, we also notice that all the educational categories have a skill premium
over unskilled worker. Ge and Yang (2012) have found that the premium for a college degree have
been the highest and is continuously rising over time. For our cross-sectional analysis, we also
found the highest premium be for the college degree in the firm.
In addition, we notice that the State dummy has also positive and significant affect on propor-
tion of skilled workers as well as average wage. It seems like the state owned firms hire higher
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proportion of skilled workers and also pay higher wages on average. We also find significantly
negative effect of pure exporting dummy (i.e. firm involved in processing trade). However, we
found significantly positive coefficient for labor intensity.
The above results supports our theoretical results where we found the inverse relationship be-
tween marginal utility of income and the price charged by the firm, proportion of skilled workers
as well as skill premium being awarded by the firm.
Conclusion & Discussion
In this paper, we have extended the recent literature analyzing the impact of export/import des-
tination on the firm activity. We have contributed by developing a theoretical model linking the
export destination to the level of skill premium awarded at the firm level and empirically testing
this theory using this huge cross-section of Chinese manufacturing firms data. We have found sig-
nificant and positive effect of export destination on proportion of skilled workers in the firm and
the skill premium being offered by the firm. It is the first paper establishing a link between export
destination and the skill premium at the firm level. In addition, in line with the recent literature, we
couldn’t find any significant impact of exporting activity on either proportion of skilled workers
as well as skill premium. It is also the first paper clearly defining the skill level by education at
the firm level in the recent trade literature. Much of the work uses the average wage or the share
of non-production workers as proxy of skills due to the unavailability of data on the educational
distribution in the firm∗.
However, to clearly establish the causal link between export destination and the skill premium
in the firm, we have to be careful about the endogeneity issue as we have cross-sectional data. All
these results establish a correlation between our variable of interests. Having only one observation
per firm, we cannot us the firm fixed affects in the analysis. We have used the interacting dummies
for 4 digit industry code and the city code, assuming, that the firms in the same city and industry
code would be similar. The results still hold even after controlling at such detailed level. †
∗This statement is true to the best of our knowledge.
†It is currently work in progress and we are working on finding suitable instrument for our analysis. We have used
couple of instruments so far and the results still hold for the skill premium at the firm level, though, these are weak
instruments in nature.
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Tables
Table 2: Dep = SKILL
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
HI 0.070∗∗ (0.006)
EXP -0.024∗∗ (0.007)
Intercept 0.420∗∗ (0.001)
N 144217
R2 0.436
F (2,31656) 59.698
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Table 3: Dep = SKILL
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
HI 0.049∗∗ (0.006)
EXP -0.018∗∗ (0.006)
AGE -0.003∗∗ (0.000)
AGE Squared 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
Cap 0.069∗∗ (0.001)
STATE 0.008∗∗ (0.002)
Intercept 0.096∗∗ (0.006)
N 144199
R2 0.47
F (6,31653) 602.755
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 4: Dep = SKILL
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
HI 0.069∗∗ (0.006)
EXP 0.008 (0.007)
AGE -0.003∗∗ (0.000)
AGE Squared 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
STATE 0.014∗∗ (0.002)
LI -0.099∗∗ (0.005)
PE -0.043∗∗ (0.007)
Intercept 0.458∗∗ (0.002)
N 144201
R2 0.441
F (7,31653) 110.209
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Table 5: Dep = Avg wage
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
SKILL 0.260∗∗ (0.009)
HI 0.060∗∗ (0.016)
EXP -0.015 (0.013)
HI*SKILL 0.279∗∗ (0.028)
Intercept 1.900∗∗ (0.004)
N 144217
R2 0.501
F (4,31656) 348.876
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 6: Dep = Avg wage
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
SKILL 0.186∗∗ (0.009)
HI 0.049∗∗ (0.016)
EXP -0.012 (0.013)
HI*SKILL 0.240∗∗ (0.026)
AGE 0.002∗∗ (0.000)
AGE Squared 0.000∗ (0.000)
Cap 0.094∗∗ (0.003)
STATE 0.011∗∗ (0.004)
Intercept 1.458∗∗ (0.015)
N 144199
R2 0.515
F (8,31653) 280.671
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Table 7: Dep = Avg wage
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
SKILL 0.278∗∗ (0.009)
HI 0.042∗ (0.016)
EXP 0.004 (0.014)
HI*SKILL 0.295∗∗ (0.028)
AGE 0.001∗ (0.000)
AGE Squared 0.000∗ (0.000)
STATE 0.018∗∗ (0.004)
LI 0.364∗∗ (0.012)
PE -0.062∗∗ (0.013)
Intercept 1.782∗∗ (0.006)
N 144201
R2 0.511
F (9,31653) 284.431
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 8: Dep = Avg wage
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
HI 0.057∗∗ (0.016)
MS 0.623∗∗ (0.177)
BS 1.093∗∗ (0.052)
Diploma 0.533∗∗ (0.028)
HS 0.107∗∗ (0.010)
HI*MS 1.197† (0.649)
HI*BS 1.291∗∗ (0.186)
HI*Diploma 0.310∗∗ (0.102)
HI*HS 0.102∗∗ (0.033)
EXP -0.001 (0.013)
Intercept 1.905∗∗ (0.004)
N 144217
R2 0.514
F (10,31656) 228.218
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Table 9: Dep = Avg wage
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
HI 0.049∗∗ (0.016)
MS 0.505∗∗ (0.174)
BS 0.901∗∗ (0.051)
Diploma 0.408∗∗ (0.027)
HS 0.076∗∗ (0.010)
HI*MS 1.081† (0.650)
HI*BS 1.184∗∗ (0.180)
HI*Diploma 0.285∗∗ (0.097)
HI*HS 0.081∗∗ (0.031)
EXP -0.001 (0.013)
AGE 0.002∗∗ (0.000)
AGE Squared 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
Cap 0.078∗∗ (0.003)
STATE 0.011∗∗ (0.004)
Intercept 1.528∗∗ (0.015)
N 144199
R2 0.523
F (14,31653) 215.227
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 10: Dep = Avg wage
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
HI 0.037∗ (0.016)
MS 0.666∗∗ (0.177)
BS 1.151∗∗ (0.051)
Diploma 0.578∗∗ (0.028)
HS 0.117∗∗ (0.010)
HI*MS 1.203† (0.625)
HI*BS 1.348∗∗ (0.184)
HI*Diploma 0.337∗∗ (0.102)
HI*HS 0.112∗∗ (0.032)
EXP 0.015 (0.014)
AGE 0.002∗∗ (0.000)
AGE Squared 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
STATE 0.016∗∗ (0.004)
LI 0.389∗∗ (0.012)
PE -0.059∗∗ (0.013)
Intercept 1.776∗∗ (0.006)
N 144201
R2 0.525
F (15,31653) 247.496
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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